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Abstract
It is well known that people’s consumption patterns change with income. Relative price
changes therefore affect rich and poor consumers differently. Yet, the standard price indices are
not income-specific and hence, the use of these mask these differences in cost-of-living. In this
paper, we study consumption inequality in India, while fully allowing for non-homotheticity.
Our analysis shows that the changes in relative prices in a large part of the period from 1993
to 2012 were pro-poor, in the sense that they favored the poor relative to the rich. As a result,
we also find that the standard measures significantly overestimate the rise in real inequality.
Moreover, we show that the allowance for non-homotheticity is quantitatively much more im-
portant in our application than the adjustment for substitution in consumption, despite the
larger attention paid to the latter in the literature. We also illustrate how conventional mea-
sures exaggerate inter-temporal changes in inequality when there is segregation in consump-
tion/production, by which we mean that people’s consumption patterns are skewed towards
goods intensively produced by people of their own group.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that people’s consumption patterns change with economic aﬄuence, i.e. that
preferences are non-homothetic. Relative price changes will hence affect income groups differently
even if all face the same set of prices (Muellbauer, 1974). Yet, the conventional price indices are
not group specific, and if used to deflate individual incomes, they therefore mask these possible
differences in cost-of-living.1 This is likely to be a problem of first-order importance when dis-
cussing distributions and inequality, but it might also be problematic for other types of analysis as
it is not very transparent whose cost of living the standard indices represent (see e.g., Beatty and
Crossley, 2016). For example, the standard consumer price index formulae would generate price
indices that represent the consumption of relatively rich individuals and due to the aggregation
technique used, the larger the inequality in the society, the richer the “representative” household.
In this paper, we study consumption inequality in India, and we construct group-specific cost-of-
living in order to do so. The period under study is 1993-94 to 2011-12 and our analysis shows
that the changes in relative prices in a large part of this period were pro-poor, meaning that they
favored the poor relative to the rich. Some of this effect is driven by relatively low price increases
for food grains during the 1990s. We also show that the pattern of relative price changes has
a large impact on measured inequality. Standard measures suggest that inequality rose steeply
during the period studied (Datt and Ravallion, 2009; Weisskopf, 2011; The World Bank, 2011).2
However, as much as about one-third of the increase between 1993-94 and 2004-05 disappears
when we apply our expenditure specific cost-of-living adjustment. This finding illustrates that
it is crucial to account for non-homotheticity when measuring consumption inequality. For the
years after 2004-05, we find that the relative price changes were pro-rich and that the standard
measures therefore somewhat understate the rise in inequality.
The standard price indices have other biases beside those induced by relying on homothetic pref-
erences. For example, the fixed basket approaches, such as the Laspeyres, the Paasche and the
classical Geary method—the latter underlying the Penn World Table—fail to incorporate substi-
tution, as the assumed consumer basket is held fixed in comparisons involving different relative
price levels. A large part of the price index literature is about how to avoid this problem (Akmal
and Dowrick, 2005; Diewert, 1978; Feenstra et al., 2012; Neary, 2004). In our empirical investi-
gation, we make an effort to disentangle the biases caused by not adjusting for substitution and
the biases caused by implicitly relying on homothetic preferences. This is done by comparing our
estimates, which incorporate both substitution and non-homotheticity, with inequality measures
derived through the Geary-index, which does not allow for either of the two, and with measures
1See Feenstra and Timmer (2015) for an overview of standard price indices used for comparisons of in-
come/consumption.
2There is much less evidence on the trend in income inequality. As one of the few exceptions, Banerjee and
Piketty (2005) present trends in top incomes and wages for the period 1922-2000 using individual tax return data.
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derived through an index that allows for substitution but that relies on homothetic preferences.
This comparison suggests that substitution alone has a very limited quantitative importance in
our application—the differences between our estimates and the traditional fixed basket approaches
are driven almost entirely by the allowance for non-homotheticity.
The analysis is conducted on household data collected by the National Sample Survey Organisation
(NSS). This is the standard source for household expenditure comparisons in India.3 Using these
survey data, we construct the group specific cost-of-living indices in three main steps. In the first
step, we calculate unit values and use those as measures of item prices (Deaton, 2008; Deaton
and Dupriez, 2011; Deaton and Tarozzi, 2000). In the second step, we characterize consumer
preferences. This is necessary in order to account for non-homotheticity. It is also necessary in
order to incorporate substitution in consumption. As a way of recovering preferences, we estimate
the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (Banks et al., 1997), using 11 aggregate consumption
groups and percentiles of the expenditure distributions within each state, sector (urban and rural)
and time period as the unit of observation.4 The system is identified through spatial and inter-
temporal variation in prices and variation in household consumption and under the assumption of
homogenous preferences. The assumption of homogeneous preferences is restrictive, but even with
this assumption, we allow for more heterogeneity, namely the heterogeneity in cost of living across
groups, than any standard analysis of inequality. Future research should aim at also addressing
heterogenous tastes in the measurement of cost of living and inequality. In the third and final
step, we make use of the estimated price and income responses to compute money metric utilities
and use that to calculate expenditure specific cost-of-living. In this latter computation, we make
use of a Geary-like reference price vector, as suggested by Neary (2004) for the homothetic case,
and by Alm˚as and Sørensen (2012) for the non-homothetic case.
The money metric utilities are, in turn, used to construct real inequality measures. To evaluate
the robustness of our findings, we repeat the procedure for a series of alternative specifications.
All these alternative specifications provide similar inequality trends as the main analysis, and
all confirm that the allowance for non-homotheticity is quantitatively more important than the
allowance for substitution.
Our expenditure specific cost-of-living indices capture the effects of relative prices on the demand
side and highlight that relative price changes affect people differently. Our findings also illustrate
how conventional measures of real inequality are biased, depending on the particular patterns of
relative price changes—if the prices of luxury goods increase relative to the prices of necessities,
they will typically overestimate real inequality, and vice versa if the opposite is the case. We are
not the first to discuss this type of bias. Some papers have, for example, proposed solutions to how
3We use the survey rounds from 1993-94, 1999-00, 2004-05, 2009-10 and 2011-12.
4The number of goods groups that we use is similar to many applications, e.g., the number of goods corresponds
to that of the Penn World Table basic headings. Our findings are robust to categorizing goods in different ways, we
have tested several groupings and our findings hold up.
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to weight individual cost-of-living to obtain one aggregated “social cost-of-living index” (Crossley
and Pendakur, 2010; Muellbauer, 1976; Pollak, 1980, 1981). More recently, other papers have
directly discussed how price changes within countries affect different income groups (Cravino and
Levchenko, 2015; Faber, 2012; Handbury, 2013; Moretti, 2013). Mishra and Ray (2011), Nicholas
et al. (2010) and Pendakur (2002) investigate real consumption inequality in India, Australia and
Canada, respectively, correcting for cost-of-living differences by indices closely related to ours.
Similarly to what is done in this paper, these authors calculate money metric utility using the
cost function. However, the other standard indices are not derived in any of the papers and they do
not make an attempt to adjust for cost-of-living differences across geographical areas. Hence, they
cannot nail down how important the adjustment for non-homotheticity is in comparisons to other
adjustments. One of the contributions of our paper is to calculate cost-of-living deflators across
time and space using standard indices and thus separate the bias stemming from the assumption
of homothethic preferences from other types of biases.
Price changes, say exogenous changes from the world market, will also almost always change the
distribution of nominal income. If the price of a good rises relative to other prices, this is likely
to lead to higher income and expenditure levels for people working in the industry producing
that particular good. This income effect should be present in all measures of real consumption
inequality, as income is likely to be reflected in expenditure data. In contrast, and as discussed
above, the full implications on cost-of-living are usually ignored. The fact that standard measures
incorporate only one out of the two likely effects of relative price changes is problematic and
might give rise to a systematic mismeasurement of the variance of inequality over time. In our
application, we find that the standard inequality measures fluctuate more over time as compared
to our measures that account for non-homotheticity. This is especially the case for the rural
sector. One plausible hypothesis consistent with this is segregation in consumption/production.
By this we mean that the effects on income and cost-of-living are systematically related, and that
people’s consumption patterns are skewed towards goods intensively produced by people of their
own group—materialized in, for example, the poor producing and consuming necessities, and the
rich, to a larger extent, producing and consuming luxury goods.5
We provide some indicative evidence of the above skewness by comparing households engaged in
crop production with other types of households. The rural crop producers are poorer than the
average household and their labor incomes react positively to increases in crop prices. Conse-
quently, we find that decreases in the relative price of cereals (at the state level) are associated
with increases in the conventional inequality measures. However, crop producers also devote a
larger-than-average share of their budget towards food grains, not because they produce these
particular goods, but simply because they are poor. Their cost-of-living therefore increases rel-
ative to the cost-of-living of richer households when the prices of grains rise. When we allow
5See Lewis (1954) for an extreme version of such a segregation.
4
for non-homotheticity, and hence adjust for the systematic difference in consumption patterns,
the association between cereal prices and inequality is substantially weaker and no longer statis-
tically significant. This particular example illustrates a more general phenomenon, namely that
conventional measures that rely on homothetic preferences overstate changes in real inequality
that are induces by relative price changes when there are elements of segregation in consump-
tion/production.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the construction of the
different cost-of-living indices used in the empirical investigation. In Section 3 we present the data
and discuss the implementation of our methods. We present our main findings in Section 4. In
Section 5 we discuss the robustness checks, whereas concluding remarks are given in Section 6.
2 Non-homothetic preferences and cost-of-living
This section gives an overview of the different cost-of-living indices used in the analysis. For
brevity, we use the notation “unit” for a unique state in a specific time period and sector (urban
or rural). Throughout, there are n commodities indexed i = 1, . . . , n, and m units indexed
j = 1, . . . ,m. For each unit, there is a price vector pj and a corresponding per capita quantity
vector qj . The total quantity consumed in a unit is given by the vector Qj . Per capita nominal
consumption in unit j is given by zj = p
jqj
T
.6
The Geary index, also known as the Geary–Khamis index, is based on the idea of evaluating quan-
tities, not by actual prices, but by a vector of average prices, pi. The real per capita consumption
level of unit j, evaluated in this way, could be written as:
Iconsj = piq
j , (1)
and the corresponding cost-of-living index as:
P consj =
pjqj
piqj
. (2)
So far, this is similar to any conventional consumer price index. Therefore, we label this index
by “cons”, for “consumption index”. As actual quantities are evaluated at the reference prices,
this index does not take into account substitution in consumption. That is, the index does not
adjust for the fact that the consumers would have chosen a different consumption basket if faced
with the reference prices instead of the actual prices in their unit. The failure of the standard
indices, such as the Geary index, to account for substitution has spurred a literature on more
structural cost-of-living indices, sometimes referred to as “the economic approach” to price index
6For simplicity, we will skip the notation for transposed in the rest of the text and use e.g., pjqj instead of pjqj
T
.
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measurement (Akmal and Dowrick, 2005; Neary, 2004).7 This approach requires the estimation of
preferences and is based on evaluating money metric utilities, m(pi, pj , zj). The real consumption
level of unit j in this system could be denoted by:
Iexp-hj = m(pi, p
j , zj) = e(pi, v(p
j , zj)), (3)
where e(.) and v(.) are the expenditure function and the indirect utility function, respectively
(that are specified once preferences have been estimated, more on this later). The cost-of-living
index of unit j could now be written as:
P exp-hj =
e(pj , v(pj , zj))
e(pi, v(pj , zj))
. (4)
The system allows for substitution in consumption, but does not allow for non-homotheticity. For
this reason, we use the labelling, “exp-h”, for “expenditure homothetic”, where the expenditure
part refers to the computation through the expenditure function. If prices differ across goods, and
if the consumption basket changes with real income, there is no unique cost-of-living for every
individual within a unit. The cost-of-living will not only depend on prices, but also on income.
Even if we are only interested in the average cost-of-living in each unit, indices of the form in (4)
cannot be applied, since there is no representative consumer when preferences are non-homothetic.
To fully allow for non-homotheticity, we construct a final real consumption index, Iexp-nhj for unit
j, as:
Iexp-nhj = L
−1
j
Lj∑
l=1
e(pi, v(pj , zjl)), (5)
where zjl gives per capita nominal consumption for individual l in unit j. The equation sums
the money metric utilities for all individuals, l = 1, . . . , Lj , in each unit. We label this extension
by “exp-nh”, for “expenditure non-homothetic”, as it fully allows for non-homothetic preferences.
The disaggregated nature of this index allows us to compute every individual’s real consumption
level from e(pi, v(pj , zjl)) or, equivalently, by adjusting their nominal consumption level using the
income-specific cost-of-living index:
P exp-nhjl =
e(pj , v(pj , zjl))
e(pi, v(pj , zjl))
. (6)
The implementation of the above expenditure indices requires a procedure to determine the ref-
erence price vector, and a characterisation of preferences. Below we discuss both of these in
turn.
7See also Alma˚s (2012), Costa (2001) and Hamilton (2001) for related approaches.
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In our main set of calculations, we determine the reference prices for all three indices in a Geary-
like fashion. The Geary approach implicitly identifies reference prices by requiring that total
consumption of each good should have the same overall value whether evaluated at the reference
prices or at each unit’s own prices, divided by their estimated cost-of-living. For the consumption
index, this could be stated as follows:
m∑
j=1
piiQij =
m∑
j=1
pijQij
P consj
, for all i = 1, . . . , n. (7)
These n linear equations in pi determine the n reference prices (up to a normalization). Neary
(2004) suggested a procedure to calculate similar types of reference prices in money metric cost-
of-living indices. The procedure calculates the reference price vector pi as in the classical Geary
calculation, but multiplies the reference prices with virtual instead of actual quantities. The
virtual quantities are those that would have been consumed if the reference prices had been the
actual prices. For this reason, we are able to account for substitution. By Shepard’s lemma, these
quantities could be identified through the Hicksian demand functions. Thus, for the expenditure
homothetic index, we could determine the reference prices by the following equations:
m∑
j=1
piiHi(pi, uj) =
m∑
j=1
pijQij
P exp-hj
, for all i = 1, . . . , n, (8)
whereHi(pi, uj) is the total amount of virtual quantities of item i that would have been consumed in
unit j at prices pi. To take account of within-unit distributions of expenditures, the corresponding
equations for the expenditure non-homothetic index become (Alm˚as and Sørensen, 2012):
m∑
j=1
pii
Nj∑
l=1
hi(pi, ujl) =
m∑
j=1
pij
Nj∑
l=1
qijl
P exp-nhjl
, for all i = 1, . . . , n. (9)
These two sets of nonlinear equations determine the reference prices in the two expenditure based
systems, just as the (linear) equations in (7) determine the reference prices for the Geary system.
In the robustness section, we propose yet two alternative procedures to determine the reference
prices. All our main results hold up when using these alternative procedures.
To recover the necessary preference parameters, we estimate the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand
System (QUAIDS) due to Banks et al. (1997). The QUAIDS system is consistent with utility
maximization. The budget share equation for good i can be expressed in the following flexible
form:
ωij = αi +
n∑
h=1
γih ln phj + βi ln yj +
λi
β(pj)
(ln yj)
2, (10)
where ln yj = ln zj − lnα(pj), zj is nominal per capita expenditure, and α(pj) and β(pj) are price
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indices that depend on the parameters.8 Moreover, the log expenditure function in the QUAIDS
could be expressed as:9
ln e(pj , uj) = lnα(p
j) +
ujβ(p
j)
1 − ujλ(pj) . (11)
The next section describes the data and the computation of the above cost-of-living indices.
3 Data and implementation
3.1 Data and price estimates
Our analysis is based on the nationwide household surveys collected by the National Sample
Survey Organization (NSS). The NSS conducts household expenditure surveys every year, but the
large surveys which can be used for state-level analysis are typically quinquennial. We use the five
most recent such survey rounds, conducted in 1993–94, 1999–00, 2004–05, 2009–10 and 2011-12.10
We limit the analysis to the 17 states labelled as “major” by the NSS. These states account for
almost the entire Indian population.11
The household surveys include information on consumption expenditure for a wide range of items.
However, to ease the estimation of the demand system, we aggregate all consumption items into
11 groups. These are: Cereal and cereal substitutes; Pulses and pulse products; Milk and milk
products; Edible oil, fruits, egg, fish and meat; Vegetables; Sugar, salt and spices; Beverages, pan,
tobacco and intoxicants; Fuel and light; Clothing; Bedding and footwear and Miscellaneous non-
food. The demand system estimation requires price estimates for each of these consumption groups,
separately for every unit in the analysis. We obtain these prices by calculating household-specific
unit values directly from the NSS data. This is possible since the surveys include information
on quantities and expenditure for the different consumption items. In all, we are able obtain
such estimates for 155 consumption items.12 Having obtained the household level unit values,
we compute the median unit value within each unit. We next aggregate to the 11 consumption
groups using the weighted country-product-dummy method (WCPD) due to Rao (1990).13 We
8The price indices are defined as follows: lnα(pj) ≡ α0 +∑i αi ln pij + 12∑i∑h γih ln pij ln phj and lnβ(pj) ≡∑
i βi ln pij .
9λ(pj) ≡∑i λi ln pij .
10This latest survey round was collected as an exception to this practice, due to severe droughts in 2009–10.
11According to the Indian Census, they account for 96 per cent of the population in 1991, 95 per cent in 2001
and 94 per cent in 2011. As Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh were carved out of Bihar and Madhya Pradesh in 2000,
they do not appear in the household surveys before 2004–05. They do, however, appear as regions in Bihar and
Madhya Pradesh such that it is possible to single them out. Therefore, we proceed by using the post-partition state
boarders.
12We drop items that either do not appear in every survey round, or that are reported in incompatible units
across survey rounds.
13This method is a modification of the unweighted version first suggested by Summers (1973).
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provide more details on this aggregation in Appendix A.
Clearly, unit values are only proxies for prices. One advantage of using unit values in our setting is
that they could be calculated from a large set of observations (in contrast to retail price estimates
which are often based on fairly small samples). Another advantage is that the unit values are
linked to actual transactions as opposed to price quotations. Still, one potential concern is quality
differences in the reported consumption goods. Because of this concern, we provide a robustness
check where we apply a quality adjustment. It is comforting that this alternative set of prices
reveals the same results as the main estimation.
The last consumption group (miscellaneous non-food) consists of goods for which we are not
able to compute unit values. This is because the NSS does not collect information on quantities
for these items. If the consumption group was equally important for rich and poor households,
we could reasonably have estimated our model without this group. However, the data clearly
suggest that the budget share devoted to these non-food items increases with total expenditure.14
Thus, the consumption group could potentially be an important source of cost-of-living differences
between the rich and the poor. Therefore, we proceed in a similar manner as Deaton (2008) and
impute prices using information from the official state- and sector-wise CPIs. These CPIs consist
of several sub-indices, such that it is possible to construct an index for goods corresponding to
our residual group. Yet, the CPIs cannot provide estimates of price levels across space, which
we need to estimate our demand system. Because of this we proceed by setting the price level
of miscellaneous non-food goods in the first time period equal to the price level of food items in
the same state and sector. For later periods we impute prices such that we match the relative
inflation rate vis-a`-vis food items observed in the CPIs. Appendix A describes this procedure in
more detail.
The NSS values consumption of goods at subsidized prices through the Public Distribution System
(PDS) at the actual prices paid. The PDS is a public scheme centered on providing quotas of
subsidized food grains (mainly rice and wheat) to eligible households. Because of the restrictions
on quantity, the program is best seen as providing implicit income transfers (Khera, 2011; Dreze
and Khera, 2013; Himanshu and Sen, 2013). In the analysis we therefore value consumption of
PDS rice and wheat at the unit-wise market prices.15 Because of this we do not use the PDS
unit values for rice and wheat in the calculation of aggregate prices for cereals. We discuss the
adjustment for the PDS and how it affects our findings in more detail in Section 5.4.
14As there is significant consumption growth during over study period, the importance of the non-food group is
also likely to change over time. The average budget share of miscellaneous non-food increases from 17 per cent in
1993-94 to 25 per cent in 2011-12 in the rural sector, and from 17 per cent to 24 per cent in the urban sector.
15The PDS items are likely to be very similar to the corresponding market goods. Our valuation is justified if
households can re-sell the PDS items at market prices without any cost, or if the amount supplied by the program
is below their desirable level. This later condition seems reasonable, given the fact that most households with PDS
consumption also purchase additional quantities of the same goods in the regular market (see Columns (9) and (10)
in Table 12).
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3.2 Estimation of demand system
We estimate the 11 goods QUAIDS demand system based on the budget share formulation shown
in Equation (10). In the estimation, we use data on 100 expenditure level groups from every unit
(mean per capita expenditure and budget shares for each group), and a Seemingly Unrelated Re-
gressions system (SUR) estimated by Maximum Likelihood. By using groups instead of individual
household data, we implicitly assume that preferences are homothetic within each of the expen-
diture groups. We consider that the within group variance in total expenditure is small enough
such that this aggregation is unproblematic. Moreover, the assumption of normally distributed
error terms is more likely to hold with grouped data (Aasness and Rødseth, 1983).
We impose homogeneity and negativity of the substitution matrix in the estimation. The ho-
mogeneity restriction is imposed simply by excluding the 11th budget share equation and by
normalizing all prices relative to this last consumption group. The negativity restriction on the
Slutsky matrix is more challenging. We follow an approach first suggested by Lau (1978) and
later applied by Moschini (1998), which is based on imposing negativity at a single data point.16
Like Neary (2004), we impose negativity at the sample means. By an appropriate scaling of the
data, the substitution terms in the Slutsky matrix at this point reduce to a simple function of
parameters only.17 Finally, we do not directly estimate on the Slutsky matrix, but rather on the
Cholesky decomposition of its mean values.
Yet, even after imposing these restrictions, there are still 85 parameters to be estimated, most of
them appearing in every budget share equation. We follow Blundell et al. (1999) in estimating the
parameters in an iterative manner. This is done by putting restrictions on the price responsiveness
in the demand system, setting the last n-k-1 rows of the Cholesky decomposition equal to zero.
This gives a “semi-flexible” system of rank k, with a smaller number of parameters to be estimated.
We gradually increase the allowed price responsiveness by increasing the rank, using the estimated
coefficients from the preceding values of k as starting values. We keep increasing the rank until
the likelihood function no longer improves, which happens at k = 8.
To obtain elasticities we first differentiate 10 and obtain:
µi =
∂ωi
∂ ln y
= βi +
2λi
β(p)
ln y, (12)
and then calculate the budget elasticity as:
ei =
µi
ωi
+ 1. (13)
16Thus, we cannot be certain that the restriction holds everywhere. It is more likely to be violated in points far
away from where negativity was imposed.
17See Appendix C in Neary (2004) for a discussion on this.
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Table 1 presents estimates for two of the key parameters in these expressions. Standard errors,
derived through bootstrapping, are shown in parentheses.18
Since the budget share equations are non-linear, the elasticities will vary with total expenditure.
From the table it could still be seen that cereal and cereal substitutes and miscellaneous non-food
are the two consumption groups for which the budget shares vary the most with total expenditure.
The budget share for cereals falls in total expenditure—at least for low levels of expenditure—
whereas the budget share for miscellaneous non-food increases for all expenditure levels.
[Table 1 about here]
4 Findings
The estimation procedure described above provides all parameters needed to compute the ex-
penditure function given in Equation (11). This, combined with consumption group prices, is
sufficient to calculate cost-of-living and real consumption inequality.19
Table 2 displays population weighted all-India cost-of-living measures by the rural and the urban
sector, relative to the first time period. The differences across the consumption index and the
two expenditure indices are fairly small for this aggregated statistic. However, the aggregated
numbers mask important differences across households within units. One illustration of this can
be found in Figure 1. The numbers underlying the figure are derived by first comparing the
cost-of-living for households in the bottom and upper two expenditure percentiles relative to the
average in each unit. Then, we display the average over all such comparisons, separately for the
rural and the urban sector. Since the figure measures relative increases in cost-of-living, a number
above (below) unity indicates that households in the particular expenditure group experienced
a higher (lower) increase in the cost-of-living as compared to the average household. The figure
suggests that the period from 1993–94 to 2004–05 was pro-poor, in the sense that the cost-of-living
increased relatively more for the rich than for the poor. Whereas the cost-of-living rose by almost
100 per cent on average for the richest one per cent in each unit, it rose by roughly 80 per cent
on average for the one per cent poorest, in this period. The overall relative price changes in the
18We conduct the bootstrapping as follows. We start with the sample of 100 expenditure groups for each unit.
Then, we draw observations from this sample, with replacement, such that we match the original number of obser-
vations. We do this 1000 times, and estimate the demand system for each of the new samples. Finally, we construct
standard errors using these 1000 sets of parameter estimates.
19We produce standard errors for both of these. For this purpose, we use the original data sample and the
set of estimated demand parameters from the bootstrapping procedure to compute 1000 different estimates of
the particular statistic. Hence, the standard errors derived over these different estimates capture the uncertainty
related to the estimated demand model. As the number of observations in the data set is large, the coefficients
of the demand system are precisely estimated and the standard errors are generally very small. This means that
almost all differences we see, across price indices and across the subsequent inequality measures, are statistically
significant (p-values< 0.00).
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period thereafter are pro-rich, however, and hence the effect is somewhat dampened if considering
the whole period up until 2011-12.
[Table 2 about here]
[Figure 1 about here]
We now proceed to investigate the full expenditure distribution, by computing inequality esti-
mates. In this section, we focus on one particular measure, namely the Theil index. In Table 3,
we present two other standard inequality measures, the Gini index and mean relative deviation,
and show that our main findings are robust to the use of these alternative measures. We also
present standard errors for the different inequality numbers that rely on the estimated demand
system, as well as the inequality measures broken down to state and urban and rural areas (Table
4). Note also that we use household-specific expenditure levels when calculating inequality (and
not expenditure group aggregates).20 Figure 2 displays trends in consumption inequality, mea-
sured by the Theil index. The first column in the figure presents inequality numbers for the rural
and urban sample combined, whereas the second and third columns show inequality estimates
for the two sectors separately. Note that the trends for all inequality estimates are significantly
different from each other (the p-values for the difference in difference estimates are very small,
p-value< 0.00).
The consumption and the expenditure homothetic cost-of-living numbers reveal close to similar
inequality estimates for all three samples.21 Thus, allowing for substitution in consumption does
not seem to be of any quantitative importance in this application (although the differences are
statistically significant, p-value< 0.00). The expenditure non-homothetic estimates deviate more
substantially. In particular, these estimates suggest a more moderate increase in inequality over
the period 1993–94 to 2004–05, indicating a pro-poor development in cost-of-living (the difference-
in-difference estimates are statistically significant, p-value< 0.00). For the next five-year period,
the opposite is true, and the homothetic indices underestimate the increase in inequality (again,
p-value< 0.00). This is especially noticeable in the rural sector where these estimates suggest a
decrease in inequality, whereas the estimates that allow for non-homotheticity reveal a modest
increase.
One advantage of the Theil index is that it is easily decomposable. The bottom panel of Figure
20We use the 17 major states when calculating inequality. Before computing the inequality estimates, we remove
the 0.1 per cent poorest and the 0.1 per cent richest households within each unit. This exclusion is done because
we are afraid that some of the extreme outliers are due to measurement errors. Our main findings are invariant to
the inclusion/exclusion of these households.
21Note that the NSS survey from 1999-00 is not fully compatible with the other survey rounds, due to some
inconsistencies in the recall periods used. See Deaton and Kozel (2005) for a detailed discussion on this. The level
of inequality in 1999-00 might therefore not be comparable with the levels in the other years. Still, we have no
reasons to expect that the inconsistency in recall period affects the differences between our three real expenditure
measures.
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2 displays between-group inequality estimates. The general pattern shown in the graphs suggests
that inequalities in average expenditure levels between the rural and the urban sector, between
states, and between states and sectors, have all increased over the period studied. Moreover,
the figures clearly suggest that the differences between the non-homothetic and the other real
expenditure measures do not stem from any of these between-group dimensions, but rather from
the fact that the former index adjusts for cost-of-living differences within units.
[Figure 2 about here]
4.1 Discussion
It turns out that we can explain a large fraction of the difference between the homothetic and
the non-homothetic inequality estimates by changes in the relative prices of cereals versus mis-
cellaneous non-foods. As can be seen from Table 1, these two consumption groups are the ones
for which the budget shares change the most with total consumption: the budget share of cereals
decreases as households become richer, whereas the budget share of miscellaneous non-food in-
creases. Figure 3 plots the percentage changes in the cereals/miscellaneous non-food price ratio
along with the percentage changes in the ratio of the non-homothetic Theil index and the homoth-
etic Theil index. As can be seen, periods in which the relative price ratio decreases (increases) are
generally accompanied by a decrease (increase) also in the ratio of inequality estimates—meaning
that the homothetic estimates overvalue (undervalue) inequality. We find the same pattern for
the inequality estimates at the state level. These correlations are shown in terms of regression
coefficients in Table 5.22
[Figure 3 about here]
[Table 5 about here]
These patterns illustrate how conventional measures overstate real inequality in situations when
the prices of luxury goods increase relative to the prices of necessities, and vice versa when the
opposite is the case. This is the case since these measures ignore the fact that relative price changes
have a different effect on people at different income levels. However, relative price changes are
likely to affect consumption inequality, not only through this cost-of-living but also through other
channels, in particular through people’s income. This latter channel is present in all measures of
consumption inequality—without any particular adjustments—since income is likely to be reflected
in expenditure data. The fact that the conventional measures incorporate the income effect but
not the effect of the change in cost-of-living, may lead to a systematic bias.
22In order to compare changes over equally long time spells, we exclude the shorter time span between the two
latest survey rounds.
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The non-homothetic inequality numbers, especially for the rural sector, exhibit less variation over
time as compared to the similar homothetic inequality estimates. This is consistent with a hypoth-
esis of segregation in consumption/production. By this we mean that individuals’ consumption
patterns are skewed towards goods intensively produced by people of their own income group.
One stark example of such segregation would be the dual economy, dating back to Lewis (1954).
In a simple version of the Lewis model, there is one poor sector producing basic subsistence con-
sumption goods, and people employed in this sector consume these goods and little else. There
is also another rich and sophisticated sector producing a variety of goods and services, largely
for those employed in the latter sector. Such a stark segregation is not very likely in reality, but
there might very well be some degree of segregation.23 If this is the case, then the conventional
measures that rely on homothetic cost-of-living adjustments will tend to exaggerate changes in
inequality that are due to relative price changes.
Below we discuss a simple theoretical framework to illustrate how segregation affects cost-of-living
and real consumption inequality. Then, we present some indicative evidence for the segregation
hypothesis by investigating rural crop producers.
4.1.1 Segregation, cost-of-living, and inequality: A simple theoretical framework
Suppose that we have two consumption goods: food (xf ) and non-food (xnf ), and two agents:
rich (r) and deprived (d). To simplify the exposition, suppose further that preferences could be
characterized by the following quasi-linear utility function:
U(xf , xnf ) = ln(xf ) + xnf . (14)
Agents maximise utility subject to the budget constraint pfxf + pnfxnf = w
i, where wi denotes
total income for agent i, while pf and pnf denote the price of food and non-food, respectively.
This simple maximization problem yields the following income-dependent budget share equations:
Sf =
pnf
wi
, Snf = 1 − pnf
wi
. (15)
From this, we see that the budget share spent on the non-food good, Snf , increases in income.
Moreover, the indirect utility function following from the maximization problem takes the form:
V (p, wi) = ln
(
pnf
pf
)
+
(
wi
pnf
− 1
)
. (16)
Suppose now that the price of the non-food good, for some exogenous reason, increases from p0nf
to p1nf (whereas the price of the food good, pf , remains constant). We denote the vector of prices
23See Ray (2013) for a brief discussion on this type of segregation.
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as p0 and p1. The individual-specific expenditure non-homothetic index, comparing period 1 with
period 0, now takes the form:
P i1 =
e(p1, v(p1, wi))
e(p0, v(p1, wi))
=
wi(
ln(
p1nf
pf
) − ln(p
0
nf
pf
) + w
i
p1nf
)
p0nf
=
1(
ln(
p1nf
pf
) − ln(p
0
nf
pf
)
)
p0nf
wi
+
p0nf
p1nf
(17)
Since ∂P i1/∂wi > 0 and w
r > wd, we see that the cost-of-living increases more for the rich agent
than for the deprived agent. This is intuitive, since the rich agent allocates a larger share of its
budget towards the non-food good and is thus relatively more hurt by the price increase.
If we denote the average income level by w¯, we could write the expenditure homethetic index
comparing period 1 to period 0 as follows:
P¯1 =
e(p1, v(p1, w¯))
e(p0, v(p1, w¯))
=
1(
ln(
p1nf
pf
) − ln(p
0
nf
pf
)
)
p0nf
w¯ +
p0nf
p1nf
. (18)
Since wr > w¯ > wd, it must also follow that P r1 > P¯1 > P
d
1 . Thus, the increase in cost-of-living,
according to this measures, lies somewhere in-between the individual increases for the rich and the
deprived agent, identified in (17). Note that P¯1 would generally not correspond to the average of
P r1 and P
d
1 . Furthermore, real consumption inequality as measured by the non-homothetic index
would be lower than its homothetic counterpart. If we measure inequality simply as the fraction
of total consumption acquired by the rich agent, this could be seen by the following expression:
wr
(wr + wd)
=
wr/P¯1
(wr/P¯1 + wd/P¯1)
>
wr/P r1
(wr/P r1 + w
d/P p1 )
. (19)
Let us now introduce the production side. More particularly, let us assume that the deprived
agent gets its labour income from the production of food, while the rich agent gets its income
from the production of non-food items. Finally, let us assume that both agents are paid according
to their marginal productivity. That is:
wd = pfFL, w
r = pnfGL, (20)
where FL and GL denote the marginal productivity of labour in food and non-food production,
respectively. From this assumption, it follows that the increase in the price of the non-food good
increases the labour income of the rich agent. Nominal inequality will therefore also rise. Since
the homothetic index uses the same cost-of-living deflator for both agents, it would give the exact
same inequality levels as the nominal values.
We have already seen that the price increase affects the cost-of-living of the rich agent more
severely than the cost-of-living of the deprived agent. Thus, the demand side effect dampens the
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increase in inequality:
wr0
(wr0 + w
d
0)
<
wr1/P
r
1
(wr1/P
r
1 + w
d
1/P
d
1 )
<
wr1
(wr1 + w
d
1)
. (21)
This stylized illustration shows how segregation in consumption/production dampens changes in
consumption inequality that are due to relative price changes. The next subsection provides some
empirical evidence on the presence of such segregation based on comparing crop producers with
other households.
4.1.2 Segregation, cost-of-living, and inequality: An empirical investigation
Table 6 presents some background statistics. As can be seen, more than half of the rural households
are engaged in crop production and those engaged are, on average, poorer than households in other
activities. The bottom part of the table shows similar numbers for rural food crop labours (these
numbers exclude self-employed crop producers). As revealed from the consumption ratios, these
households are considerably poorer: they are, on average, roughly 25 per cent poorer than rural
households outside crop production, and about 30 to 40 per cent poorer than all households outside
crop production.
When crop prices rise more than other prices, we would expect the nominal incomes of these rural
farmers, and hence also their total expenditure, to increase relative to the income and expenditure
of other households. To investigate this, we look at the correlation between the percentage changes
in the expenditure ratios (from Table 6) and the percentage changes in the price of cereals over
the price of miscellaneous non-foods. Table 7 presents regression estimates at the state level. The
estimates shown in the first two columns are based on expenditure ratios for all crop producers,
whereas those in the third and the fourth column are based on crop labourers only. As can be
seen from the positive coefficients, periods with relatively large (small) increases in the prices for
cereals are accompanied by an increase (decrease) in this expenditure ratio, meaning that the gap
between crop labourers and other labourers decreases (increases). This suggests that their labour
income changes when there is a change in relative prices. As the crop producers are relatively poor,
we would also expect that the income effect helps decrease overall inequality. Columns (1) and
(2) in Table 8 present the coefficients from two regressions of the percentage changes in inequality
versus the percentage changes in the relative price of cereals versus miscellaneous non-foods, by
states. Not surprisingly, increases in these relative prices are associated with lower consumption
inequality, as measured by the homothetic measures. This holds within the rural sector, and more
strongly for the rural and the urban sector combined.
Our non-homothetic index captures this nominal income effect but, in addition, it captures the
differential effect of price changes on cost-of-living. Given that the crop producers are relatively
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poor, and given that the budget share of cereals tends to fall with total expenditure, we would
expect the group as a whole to devote a higher-than-average share of its budget towards cereals.
In Table 9, we show estimates from two regressions of cereal budget shares versus two binary
variables indicating whether a household is engaged in crop production as labour or self-employed,
respectively. The regression coefficients shown in the first column suggest that the crop labourers
allocated almost a five percentage point higher budget share towards cereals as compared to other
households outside crop production. In the regression shown in the second column, we include
the logarithm of per capita expenditure and its square as explanatory variables. When doing this,
the size of the coefficient decreases by more than two-thirds, indicating that the main reason for
the relatively high cereal budget share is that these households are poor.
Since the farmers devote a relatively large share of their budget towards cereals, higher cereal
prices will have a relatively large impact on their cost-of-living, which according to the theoretical
exposition should weaken the relationship between changes in relative cereal price and inequality.
As can be seen from Columns (3) and (4), in Table 8, the association is still negative, but the
size of the coefficients is of a small magnitude and they are not statistically significantly different
from zero.
What this empirical exercise illustrates is that the conventional inequality measures tend to over-
estimate changes in inequality that are due to changes in relative prices when there is segregation
in production/consumption.
[Table 6 to 9 about here]
5 Robustness
In this section, we present four types of robustness checks. All these alternative specifications
provide similar trends in real consumption inequality as in our main analysis. Moreover, for
all specifications, we find that the allowance for non-homotheticity is quantitatively much more
important than the allowance for substitution in consumption.
5.1 Alternative references prices
As a first robustness check, we compute the cost-of-living indices using two alternative sets of
reference prices. First, we adopt the procedure suggested by Barnett et al. (2009), and later
implemented by Feenstra et al. (2012). This procedure is based on using every unit’s price vector
as a reference, and then taking a geometric mean of all such comparisons. For brevity, we refer
to these references as “Diewert prices”. Using the Diewert prices as a base price vector, the real
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consumption level of unit j derived through the consumption index could be expressed as:
Iconsj =
m∏
s
(psqj)
1
m . (22)
The expenditure homothetic index becomes:
Iexp-hj =
m∏
s
e(ps, v(pj , zj))
1
m , (23)
whereas the expenditure non-homothetic index can be written as:
Iexp-nhj =
m∏
s
(
L−1
∑
l
e(ps, v(pj , zjl))
) 1
m
. (24)
As a second set of alternative reference prices, we simply use all unit prices as references, instead of
taking the geometric mean. As most methods of calculating reference prices would produce some
average of the price vectors of the individual units, this procedure should be seen as extremely
flexible. However, for most applications, it is not very convenient, as it gives the same number of
real consumption estimates for each unit as the total number of units.
Figure 4 plots the trends in inequality using these different reference price vectors. The left
column shows the expenditure non-homothetic Theil index, whereas the middle and the right
columns plot the difference between these numbers and the inequality estimates derived through
the consumption index and the expenditure homothetic index, respectively.24 The solid lines,
labeled “Geary ref.”, are based on the Geary reference prices (as the inequality estimates presented
in the main analysis), while the dotted lines, labeled “Diewert ref.”, are based on the cost-of-living
measures using the Diewert reference prices. Finally, the light grey lines use the price vectors of
all units as references. As could be seen from all three panels, the choice between the Geary
and the Diewert reference prices does not affect the subsequent inequality estimates (they are
indistinguishable in the graphs). We get somewhat different inequality numbers within the large
set of reference prices based on the price vectors of every unit, but as can be seen from the grey
bands, the trends in both inequality levels as well as in the difference between the inequality
measures are not affected to any considerable extent.
[Figure 4 about here]
24When doing this, we normalize the difference to zero in the first time period.
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5.2 Quality-adjusted unit values
In the main analysis, we use median unit values as proxies for prices. Even though we are able to
compute these unit values at a fine level of goods disaggregation, many of the consumption items
might still not be perfectly homogeneous. This could be problematic, as households’ reported
unit values will be affected by the quality of the underlying good. If households from different
regions systematically purchase goods with different quality levels, then median unit values will
provide biased estimates of the true price differences. Deaton et al. (2004) suggest a regression-
based method to correct for this possible bias. They start out by assuming that variation in the
reported unit values stems from a mixture of quality and true price differences:
ln uvil = ln pij + ln ϕil, (25)
where uvil is the unit value of item i reported by household l, pij is the true item price in unit j
(at some base quality level common for every unit), while ϕil is the quality of the item consumed
by household l. A convenient assumption is that the chosen quality could be represented as a
log-linear function of real consumption:
ln uvil = ln pij + biln yl + γX, (26)
where yl is the real consumption level of household l, and X is a vector of other possible household
covariates. The bi-coefficient could be interpreted as the elasticity of quality with respect to total
expenditure. From this it could be seen that the quality-bias in the unit values is a function of the
real consumption level and the quality elasticity. The procedure proposed in Deaton et al. (2004)
only partially removes this bias, since it replaces real per capita expenditure with nominal per
capita expenditure. Provided that cost-of-living differs across regions and over time, the quality-
adjusted prices will therefore also include a bias, which depends on the expenditure elasticity and
the overall price level in each unit. More particularly, the estimated item prices in a unit would
be more biased the further apart the cost-of-living in the unit is from the average. Provided
that the expenditure elasticity is positive, meaning that the quality consumed increases with total
expenditure, we could also infer that the procedure underestimates spatial cost-of-living differences
across units, as it undervalues the item prices in high-cost areas and overvalues the item prices in
low-cost areas. By the same logic, we could infer that the procedure underestimates increases in
cost-of-living over time—provided that the overall cost-of-living rises—since it overestimates item
prices in early time periods, and underestimates item prices in later time periods.
The bias could be avoided by replacing nominal expenditure in Equation (26) by real expenditure.
The main challenge is that we need the unbiased item prices to derive an estimate of the overall
cost-of-living in each unit. Therefore, we propose an iterative method. In the first step, we estimate
the following regression, separately for every item i, using nominal per capita expenditure values
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as in Deaton et al. (2004):
ln uvl =
∑
j
djDj + blnzlj + γX, (27)
where Dj is a set of unit dummies, zlj is the nominal expenditure level of household l living in
unit j and X is a vector of household covariates (the number of household member below 16 years
old, the number of members above 16 and the age of the household head). We identify the price
component from the unit dummies. The bias in the subsequent price measure of item i can be
expressed as:
ln pij − ln ˆpij,1 = biln(e(pi, v(pj , zjl))) − bˆilnzlj , (28)
where e(pi, v(pj , zjl)) and zlj display the mean real and nominal expenditure levels in unit j,
respectively, relative to some base. The subscript on pˆij,1 denotes that this is our first estimate
of pij . Next, we use these proxies of the item prices to estimate aggregated consumption group
prices, and then to compute our non-homothetic cost-of-living index as described in Section 2.
Having obtained these overall cost-of-living measures, we re-run the regression from Equation
(27), again separately for every item i, but now using the real expenditure measures instead of
the nominal values:
ln uvl =
∑
j
djDj + bln(e(pi1, v(
ˆ
pj1, zjl))) + γX. (29)
From this estimation, we are able to extract a new set of item price measures. The bias in this
price estimate of item i can be expressed as:
ln pij − ln ˆpij,2 = biln(e(pi, v(pj , zjl))) − bˆiln(e(pi1, v( ˆpj1, zjl))). (30)
The absolute size of the bias in ln pˆij,2 is smaller than the bias in ln pˆij,1, provided that:∣∣∣∣biln(e(pi, v(pj , zjl))) − bˆiln(e(pi1, v( ˆpj1, zjl)))∣∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣biln(e(pi, v(pj , zjl))) − bˆilnzlj∣∣∣ . (31)
Hence, if this requirement is fulfilled, we could repeat the procedure and the solution should
eventually converge.
Table 10 presents unit value estimates for the eight most important items in terms of average
budget shares. All numbers in the table are derived as population weighted averages of the unit
specific numbers. The first row for each good shows the median unit values (that is, averages
over the median unit values within each unit), whereas the second row presents quality adjusted
numbers based on the methodology in Deaton et al. (2004). The following five rows show the
unit value estimates from the five succeeding iterations in our proposed procedure. The numbers
in parenthesis display the b-coefficients from the item-specific regressions. If each of these item
groups had consisted of completely homogeneous goods, these coefficients should have been close
to zero. For items such as sugar and oils, which are likely to be rather homogeneous, we see that
the coefficients are indeed close to zero. Thus, the biases in the median unit values and in the
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adjusted prices from the methodology in Deaton et al. (2004) are likely to be small. However, goods
within consumption headings such as “garments” are clearly more heterogeneous, and the two
aforementioned procedures are therefore likely to produce more seriously biased price estimates.
[Table 10 about here]
Figure 5 presents the price trends for the different groups of consumption items.25 A first thing
to note from the figure is that the adjustment of Deaton et al. (2004) gives lower price increases
as compared to the median unit values. This is as expected, given positive values of the different
b-coefficients and increases in overall cost-of-living over time. A second thing to notice is that
the price estimates derived from our iteration procedure are generally somewhere in-between the
two other price estimates, although much closer to the median unit values. Therefore, it is not
very surprising that the quality adjustment does not change our final inequality estimates to
any considerable extent. The graphs to the left in Figure 6 show inequality trends derived from
our non-homothetic cost-of-living index, separately for the median unit values and the quality
adjusted unit values, whereas the middle and the right graphs display the difference between
these numbers and the inequality numbers from the consumption and the expenditure homothetic
indices, respectively. As can be seen, the differences between the two sets of estimates are close
to negligible.
[Figure 5 about here]
[Figure 6 about here]
5.3 Equivalence scaling and demographics
As a third robustness check, we repeat the whole analysis using equivalence scaling. The key
difference between these estimates and those in the main analysis is the composition of households
in the expenditure groups used for estimation of the demand system and for the calculation of the
cost-of-living indices. Various equivalence scales have been proposed in the literature. We use the
standard OECD scale of 1982. This scale gives a weight of 1 to the first adult, a weight of 0.7 to
the rest of the adults in the household, and a weight of 0.5 to all children. We define a child as
an individual aged below 16.
The resulting inequality estimates are presented in Figure 7. The use of equivalence scales reduces
the levels of inequality somewhat, as can be seen from the graph in the left column. Still, the
trends in inequality, as well as the differences between the various estimates, are almost identical
to the main analysis.
25We do not present the 11th group here, since it is derived by combining the unit value estimates with information
from the official CPIs.
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[Figure 7 about here]
Relative prices may affect people differently not only because preferences are non-homothetic, but
also because people live in households with different compositions. To more directly test whether
our results are driven by differences in family composition, we conduct the whole analysis for a
range of subsamples. In each of these subsamples, we only include households with an identical
composition of adults and children.
Table 11 shows the number of households in each of our subsamples. Since we need a reasonable
number of households within each state, we choose subsamples with at least 3000 observations in
each survey round. Still, there are too few observations within each of these to construct percentiles
for every unit. Therefore, we base the estimation of the QUAIDS system, and the subsequent
cost-of-living measures, on 20 expenditure groups instead of 100 as in the main analysis.
Figure 8 and 9 display cost-of-living for the bottom and upper two expenditure groups, relative
to the average, for the rural and the urban sector, respectively. As can be seen from these figures,
the trends are very similar across all these subsamples, which suggests that our inequality and
cost-of-living trends are not driven by differences in family composition.26
[Table 11 about here]
[Figure 8 and 9 about here]
5.4 The Public Distribution System (PDS)
In the main analysis, we value the consumption of subsidized goods through the PDS at local
market prices. As a fourth robustness check, we here estimate cost-of-living and inequality while
evaluating these goods at the actual prices paid. This robustness check is interesting in its own
right, as it tells us something about the distributional impact of the public scheme.
Table 12 presents some background statistics of the PDS. The first two columns show the share
of households consuming any PDS rice and PDS wheat, respectively, while the next two columns
display the average per capita quantities consumed among these households. As can be seen,
the average quantities are fairly stable over time, while the coverage of households—especially
in the rural sector—has increased substantially. Columns (5) to (8) display the average across
the median unit values for the subsidized PDS items and the corresponding market items. The
PDS prices have been close to constant over time, whereas market prices have grown roughly
threefold—meaning that the value of having access to the scheme has risen substantially over
26The inequality numbers for each of these subsamples are less interesting, since they are based on completely
different populations than those in our main analysis.
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time. This, together with the increase in coverage, means that the choice of how to treat PDS
consumption will be more important for the later survey rounds. The two final columns present
the fraction of households with PDS consumption of either rice or wheat that also consume the
same goods from the regular market. As can be seen from these columns, the majority of the PDS
households purchase additional amounts from the regular market.
Figure 10 shows how the inequality estimates change when we evaluate the PDS items at actual
prices paid. As the program is (at least intentionally) targeted towards the poor, it is not surprising
that the inequality numbers rise somewhat as compared to those presented in the main analysis.27
However, the trends and the differences between the three sets of estimates are similar.
[Table 12 about here]
[Figure 10 about here]
6 Concluding remarks
This paper studies price changes and real consumption inequality in India through adjusting
for expenditure specific cost-of-living. We find that in periods when the prices of necessities
decreased relative to other goods (1993-94 to 2004-05 and 2009-10 to 2011-12), traditional indices
overestimate the increase in inequality whereas the opposite is true for the period when the prices
of necessities increased relative to other goods (2004-05 to 2009-10). We also show that taking
non-homotheticity into account is quantitatively much more important than the adjustment for
substitution in consumption, despite the larger attention given to the substitution bias in the price
index literature.
All of our findings are robust to various robustness checks. Moreover, our inequality estimates ex-
hibit fewer fluctuations over time as compared to estimates that do not allow for non-homotheticity.
This difference is consistent with a hypothesis of segregation in consumption/production, mean-
ing that people intensively consume goods produced by people of their own income group. If
such segregation is present, we would also expect conventional estimates to overstate changes in
inequality due to relative price changes. We provide some empirical support for this hypothesis,
by comparing households in crop production with other types of households.
27For evidence on how the PDS affects measures of poverty, see Dreze and Khera (2013) and Himanshu and Sen
(2013).
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Appendix A Aggregation and imputation of prices for miscella-
neous non-food
This section explains in detail how we construct the consumption group price measures.
Having obtained the median unit values for each unit (states-sectors), we aggregate the item level
estimates to consumption groups. This aggregation is done using the weighted country-product-
dummy method (WCPD) due to Rao (1990). The procedure is based on a set of regressions,
where the logarithm of the item prices is regressed on a set of dummy variables using weighted
least squares. We thus run the following regression, separately for every consumption group:
ln pˆij =
∑
j
αjDj +
∑
i
biDi, (32)
where Dj is a set of unit dummy variables, and Di is a dummy variable for every item i in each
consumption group. We use the item-wise average budget shares in each unit as weights. Finally,
the aggregate price estimates for each consumption group are found directly from the dummy
coefficients as:
ln pˆj = αj . (33)
The last consumption group (miscellaneous non-food) consists of goods for which we are not able
to compute unit values, since the NSS does not collect information on quantities for these items.
There is no straightforward way of imputing prices for this residual group. Yet, it seems most
natural to use the official state-specific consumer price index (see also Deaton, 2008). We proceed
as follows: we first calculate a unit-specific food price index using the price estimates from all
food items and the WCPD method. The all-India values of this food price index are displayed in
Table 13, relative to the first time period and separate for the rural and the urban sector. The
second column in the table shows the corresponding numbers from the Consumer Price Index for
Industrial Workers (CPIIW) for the urban sector, and the Consumer Price Index for Agricultural
Labourers (CPIAL) for the rural sector. These numbers are derived as the weighted average of the
state-specific indices. In the third column, we show the CPI sub-index that corresponds to our
miscellaneous non-food consumption group.28 Finally, the fourth column presents the CPI food
price increases, relative to the miscellaneous non-food price increases. We use this ratio to scale
our last consumption group. This seems like a reasonable procedure; especially since our unit
value food indices roughly follow the same trends as the CPI food indices. For the first period, we
set the prices of the miscellaneous non-food group in each unit equal to their values for the unit
value food index. For later periods, we impute values equal to the same food index multiplied by
the relative inflation rates displayed in the fourth column of the table.
28For the rural sector, this CPI sub-index exactly matches our 11th consumption group, while the CPI for the
urban sector has two sub-indices for the goods included in our residual group. The sub-index displayed in the table
is therefore constructed as a weighted average of the miscellaneous non-food and the housing CPI sub-indices.
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Appendix B Tables and figures
Table 1: Parameters QUAIDS
β λ
Cereal and cereal substitutes -0.1224 (0.0011) 0.0308 (0.0014)
Pulses and pulse products -0.0111 (0.0002) -0.0024 (0.0002)
Milk and milk products 0.0201 (0.0009) -0.0293 (0.0009)
Edible oil, fruits, egg, fish and meat -0.0086 (0.0005) -0.0105 (0.0005)
Vegetables -0.0213 (0.0003) -0.0008 (0.0006)
Sugar, salt and spices -0.0136 (0.0002) -0.0033 (0.0003)
Beverages, pan, tobacco and intoxicants 0.0150 (0.0007) -0.0026 (0.0009)
Fuel and light -0.0213 (0.0004) -0.0030 (0.0008)
Clothing -0.0083 (0.0002) -0.0020 (0.0004)
Bedding and footwear 0.0021 (0.0001) -0.0020 (0.0001)
Miscellaneous non-food 0.1693 (0.0010) 0.0252 (0.0020)
Note: The table displays two of the key parameters from the estimation of the QUAIDS demand system.
Standard errors derived through bootstrapping are shown in parentheses.
Table 2: All-India cost-of-living relative to 1993–94
Consumption Index Expenditure Index
Homothetic Non-homothetic
(1) (2) (3)
Rural
1993–94 100.0 100.0 (0.00) 100.0 (0.00)
1999–00 158.8 158.4 (0.03) 158.0 (0.02)
2004–05 184.6 184.7 (0.07) 183.5 (0.06)
2009–10 280.0 281.1 (0.07) 281.5 (0.06)
2011–12 329.0 329.9 (0.08) 328.5 (0.08)
Urban
1993–94 100.0 100.0 (0.00) 100.0 (0.00)
1999–00 156.6 156.5 (0.02) 156.6 (0.01)
2004–05 188.9 186.6 (0.07) 185.6 (0.06)
2009–10 286.2 285.0 (0.06) 285.4 (0.04)
2011–12 341.4 340.0 (0.09) 338.1 (0.08)
Note: All numbers are population weighted, using the multipliers provided by the NSS. The non-homothetic
indices are normalized such that they give the same cost-of-living for all expenditure groups within each unit in
the first period. Standard errors derived through bootstrapping are shown in parentheses.
28
T
a
b
l
e
3
:
In
eq
u
a
li
ty
es
ti
m
a
te
s
T
h
e
il
G
in
i
M
e
a
n
re
la
ti
v
e
d
e
v
ia
ti
o
n
C
o
n
s
E
x
p
-h
E
x
p
-n
h
C
o
n
s
E
x
p
-h
E
x
p
-n
h
C
o
n
s
E
x
p
-h
E
x
p
-n
h
C
o
m
b
in
e
d
1
9
9
3
-9
4
0
.1
4
5
7
2
0
.1
4
5
9
8
0
.1
4
5
9
2
0
.2
8
3
5
6
0
.2
8
3
8
1
0
.2
8
3
8
2
0
.1
3
0
3
2
0
.1
3
0
5
8
0
.1
3
0
5
7
(0
.0
0
0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
1
)
1
9
9
9
-0
0
0
.1
5
8
4
4
0
.1
5
8
9
2
0
.1
5
5
7
4
0
.2
9
5
2
4
0
.2
9
5
7
9
0
.2
9
2
8
3
0
.1
4
0
4
1
0
.1
4
0
9
3
0
.1
3
8
0
6
(0
.0
0
0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
3
)
2
0
0
4
-0
5
0
.2
0
1
7
6
0
.2
0
4
6
1
0
.1
9
2
8
3
0
.3
2
4
7
3
0
.3
2
7
0
0
0
.3
1
8
7
1
0
.1
7
0
6
9
0
.1
7
3
0
1
0
.1
6
4
1
5
(0
.0
0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
6
)
2
0
0
9
-1
0
0
.2
0
4
7
6
0
.2
0
6
2
8
0
.2
0
4
9
1
0
.3
2
5
8
8
0
.3
2
7
1
1
0
.3
2
6
6
2
0
.1
7
1
6
9
0
.1
7
2
9
9
0
.1
7
2
3
1
(0
.0
0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
1
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
7
)
2
0
1
1
-1
2
0
.2
1
4
9
9
0
.2
1
5
2
2
0
.2
0
7
8
5
0
.3
3
5
1
6
0
.3
3
5
3
1
0
.3
2
9
8
8
0
.1
8
1
5
2
0
.1
8
1
6
9
0
.1
7
5
5
8
(0
.0
0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
6
)
R
u
ra
l
1
9
9
3
-9
4
0
.1
1
7
3
0
0
.1
1
7
2
4
0
.1
1
7
4
5
0
.2
5
6
5
5
0
.2
5
6
5
7
0
.2
5
6
8
0
0
.1
3
0
3
2
0
.1
3
0
5
8
0
.1
3
0
5
7
(0
.0
0
0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
7
4
)
(0
.0
0
0
7
4
)
1
9
9
9
-0
0
0
.1
1
9
7
0
0
.1
2
0
2
6
0
.1
1
6
6
3
0
.2
5
9
9
7
0
.2
6
0
6
5
0
.2
5
6
7
9
0
.1
4
0
4
1
0
.1
4
0
9
3
0
.1
3
8
0
6
(0
.0
0
0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
9
9
)
(0
.0
0
1
0
0
)
2
0
0
4
-0
5
0
.1
4
8
1
4
0
.1
4
8
9
3
0
.1
4
1
0
0
0
.2
7
9
4
5
0
.2
8
0
2
5
0
.2
7
3
1
1
0
.1
7
0
6
9
0
.1
7
3
0
1
0
.1
6
4
1
5
(0
.0
0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
1
4
2
)
(0
.0
0
1
3
4
)
2
0
0
9
-1
0
0
.1
4
1
0
5
0
.1
4
0
6
8
0
.1
4
2
0
8
0
.2
7
5
0
0
0
.2
7
4
7
7
0
.2
7
5
4
9
0
.1
7
1
6
9
0
.1
7
2
9
9
0
.1
7
2
3
1
(0
.0
0
0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
1
6
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
5
6
)
2
0
1
1
-1
2
0
.1
5
3
4
4
0
.1
5
2
5
2
0
.1
4
8
0
5
0
.2
8
6
8
3
0
.2
8
5
9
9
0
.2
8
1
0
6
0
.1
8
1
5
2
0
.1
8
1
6
9
0
.1
7
5
5
8
(0
.0
0
0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
1
5
6
)
(0
.0
0
1
5
1
)
U
rb
a
n
1
9
9
3
-9
4
0
.1
6
8
5
0
0
.1
6
8
7
7
0
.1
6
8
5
7
0
.3
0
9
1
4
0
.3
0
9
4
1
0
.3
0
9
2
7
0
.1
3
0
3
2
0
.1
3
0
5
8
0
.1
3
0
5
7
(0
.0
0
0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
7
6
)
(0
.0
0
0
7
6
)
1
9
9
9
-0
0
0
.1
8
3
6
7
0
.1
8
3
8
2
0
.1
8
2
5
5
0
.3
2
4
0
4
0
.3
2
4
2
1
0
.3
2
3
5
6
0
.1
4
0
4
1
0
.1
4
0
9
3
0
.1
3
8
0
6
(0
.0
0
0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
0
8
8
)
(0
.0
0
0
9
5
)
2
0
0
4
-0
5
0
.2
2
9
8
8
0
.2
3
0
5
2
0
.2
1
4
8
8
0
.3
5
8
0
7
0
.3
5
8
6
3
0
.3
4
7
7
8
0
.1
7
0
6
9
0
.1
7
3
0
1
0
.1
6
4
1
5
(0
.0
0
0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
1
4
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
1
1
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
9
8
)
2
0
0
9
-1
0
0
.2
4
0
2
0
0
.2
4
0
2
2
0
.2
3
5
7
1
0
.3
6
2
5
7
0
.3
6
2
8
5
0
.3
6
0
2
5
0
.1
7
1
6
9
0
.1
7
2
9
9
0
.1
7
2
3
1
(0
.0
0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
1
7
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
1
0
)
(0
.0
0
1
2
7
)
(0
.0
0
1
2
0
)
2
0
1
1
-1
2
0
.2
3
9
8
5
0
.2
4
0
0
9
0
.2
3
0
1
7
0
.3
6
2
2
2
0
.3
6
2
6
3
0
.3
5
5
8
2
0
.1
8
1
5
2
0
.1
8
1
6
9
0
.1
7
5
5
8
(0
.0
0
0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
0
9
8
)
(0
.0
0
0
9
2
)
N
o
te
:
“
C
o
n
s”
d
en
o
te
s
th
e
co
n
su
m
p
ti
o
n
in
d
ex
;
“
E
x
p
-h
”
d
en
o
te
s
th
e
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
h
o
m
o
th
et
ic
in
d
ex
,
a
n
d
“
E
x
p
-n
h
”
d
en
o
te
s
th
e
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
n
o
n
-h
o
m
o
th
et
ic
in
d
ex
.
T
h
e
m
ea
n
re
la
ti
v
e
d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
in
eq
u
a
li
ty
m
ea
su
re
is
d
er
iv
ed
a
s
th
e
d
iff
er
en
ce
in
th
e
lo
g
a
ri
th
m
s
o
f
th
e
a
ri
th
m
et
ic
m
ea
n
a
n
d
th
e
g
eo
m
et
ri
c
m
ea
n
.
T
h
e
n
u
m
b
er
s
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
is
d
is
p
la
y
st
a
n
d
a
rd
d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
s
d
er
iv
ed
th
ro
u
g
h
b
o
o
ts
tr
a
p
p
in
g
.
W
e
d
er
iv
e
th
es
e
b
y
ru
n
n
in
g
1
0
0
0
re
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
s
o
f
th
e
es
ti
m
a
ti
o
n
o
f
th
e
Q
U
A
ID
S
m
o
d
el
,
a
n
d
b
y
co
m
p
u
ti
n
g
th
e
su
b
se
q
u
en
t
in
eq
u
a
li
ty
m
ea
su
re
s
fo
r
a
ll
th
es
e
re
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
s.
T
h
is
w
o
rk
w
a
s
p
er
fo
rm
ed
o
n
th
e
A
b
el
C
lu
st
er
,
ow
n
ed
b
y
th
e
U
n
iv
er
si
ty
o
f
O
sl
o
a
n
d
th
e
N
o
rw
eg
ia
n
m
et
a
ce
n
te
r
fo
r
H
ig
h
P
er
fo
rm
a
n
ce
C
o
m
p
u
ti
n
g
(N
O
T
U
R
).
29
T
a
b
l
e
4
:
T
h
ei
l
in
d
ex
b
y
st
a
te
a
n
d
se
ct
o
rs
1
9
9
3
–
9
4
1
9
9
9
–
0
0
2
0
0
4
–
0
5
2
0
0
9
–
1
0
2
0
1
1
–
1
2
C
on
s
E
x
p
-h
E
x
p
-n
h
C
on
s
E
x
p
-h
E
x
p
-n
h
C
o
n
s
E
x
p
-h
E
x
p
-n
h
C
o
n
s
E
x
p
-h
E
x
p
-n
h
C
o
n
s
E
x
p
-h
E
x
p
-n
h
R
u
ra
l
A
n
d
h
ra
P
ra
d
es
h
0.
11
0
0.
11
0
0.
11
0
0.
09
6
0
.0
9
6
0
.0
9
3
0
.1
2
2
0
.1
2
2
0
.1
1
9
0
.1
2
7
0
.1
2
7
0
.1
2
9
0
.1
0
1
0
.1
0
1
0
.0
9
6
A
ss
am
0.
04
9
0.
04
9
0.
04
9
0.
06
8
0
.0
6
8
0
.0
7
0
0
.0
6
1
0
.0
6
1
0
.0
5
6
0
.0
7
9
0
.0
7
9
0
.0
8
0
0
.0
7
9
0
.0
7
9
0
.0
8
0
B
ih
ar
0.
07
4
0.
07
4
0.
07
4
0.
07
0
0
.0
7
0
0
.0
7
1
0
.0
6
3
0
.0
6
3
0
.0
6
1
0
.0
7
7
0
.0
7
7
0
.0
7
9
0
.0
7
0
0
.0
7
0
0
.0
7
0
C
h
h
at
ti
sg
ar
h
0.
07
0
0.
07
0
0.
07
0
0.
09
5
0
.0
9
5
0
.0
8
8
0
.1
2
5
0
.1
2
5
0
.1
1
5
0
.0
8
0
0
.0
8
0
0
.0
8
0
0
.0
9
4
0
.0
9
4
0
.0
9
1
G
u
ja
ra
t
0.
07
9
0.
07
9
0.
07
9
0.
09
2
0
.0
9
2
0
.0
9
0
0
.1
1
5
0
.1
1
5
0
.1
0
8
0
.1
1
1
0
.1
1
1
0
.1
1
0
0
.1
1
4
0
.1
1
4
0
.1
1
0
H
ar
ya
n
a
0.
11
9
0.
11
9
0.
11
9
0.
10
1
0
.1
0
1
0
.0
8
9
0
.2
1
3
0
.2
1
3
0
.1
8
6
0
.1
2
8
0
.1
2
8
0
.1
2
7
0
.1
0
5
0
.1
0
5
0
.0
9
7
J
h
ar
k
h
an
d
0.
07
9
0.
07
9
0.
07
9
0.
09
6
0
.0
9
6
0
.0
9
8
0
.0
7
6
0
.0
7
6
0
.0
7
0
0
.0
7
1
0
.0
7
1
0
.0
7
3
0
.0
8
3
0
.0
8
3
0
.0
8
6
K
ar
n
at
ak
a
0.
09
7
0.
09
7
0.
09
7
0.
10
0
0
.1
0
0
0
.1
0
1
0
.1
1
4
0
.1
1
4
0
.1
0
8
0
.0
9
2
0
.0
9
2
0
.0
9
9
0
.1
3
3
0
.1
3
3
0
.1
3
3
K
er
al
a
0.
13
3
0.
13
3
0.
13
3
0.
12
2
0
.1
2
2
0
.1
2
6
0
.1
8
7
0
.1
8
7
0
.1
8
6
0
.1
8
7
0
.1
8
7
0
.1
9
7
0
.1
9
1
0
.1
9
1
0
.1
9
7
M
ad
h
ya
P
ra
d
es
h
0.
10
5
0.
10
5
0.
10
5
0.
10
7
0
.1
0
7
0
.0
9
5
0
.1
1
3
0
.1
1
3
0
.1
0
8
0
.1
3
2
0
.1
3
2
0
.1
3
0
0
.1
2
3
0
.1
2
3
0
.1
2
0
M
ah
ar
as
h
tr
a
0.
12
4
0.
12
4
0.
12
4
0.
11
5
0
.1
1
5
0
.1
1
8
0
.1
4
6
0
.1
4
6
0
.1
4
1
0
.1
0
1
0
.1
0
1
0
.1
0
1
0
.1
2
0
0
.1
2
0
0
.1
0
9
O
d
is
h
a
0.
09
6
0.
09
6
0.
09
6
0.
09
8
0
.0
9
8
0
.0
9
7
0
.1
2
3
0
.1
2
3
0
.1
1
6
0
.0
9
8
0
.0
9
8
0
.1
0
0
0
.0
8
7
0
.0
8
7
0
.0
8
6
P
u
n
ja
b
0.
09
9
0.
09
9
0.
09
9
0.
09
9
0
.0
9
9
0
.0
9
8
0
.1
3
5
0
.1
3
5
0
.1
3
0
0
.1
3
1
0
.1
3
1
0
.1
3
4
0
.1
2
3
0
.1
2
3
0
.1
2
2
R
a
ja
st
h
an
0.
08
8
0.
08
8
0.
08
8
0.
07
7
0
.0
7
7
0
.0
7
9
0
.0
8
7
0
.0
8
7
0
.0
8
0
0
.0
8
5
0
.0
8
5
0
.0
9
3
0
.0
9
1
0
.0
9
1
0
.0
9
6
T
am
il
N
ad
u
0.
14
1
0.
14
1
0.
14
1
0.
11
8
0
.1
1
8
0
.1
0
9
0
.1
2
0
0
.1
2
0
0
.1
0
8
0
.1
0
2
0
.1
0
2
0
.1
0
5
0
.1
3
3
0
.1
3
3
0
.1
2
9
U
tt
ar
P
ra
d
es
h
0.
11
3
0.
11
3
0.
11
3
0.
10
9
0
.1
0
9
0
.0
9
7
0
.1
1
5
0
.1
1
5
0
.1
0
3
0
.0
9
7
0
.0
9
7
0
.0
9
3
0
.1
1
8
0
.1
1
8
0
.0
9
9
W
es
t
B
en
ga
l
0.
08
9
0.
08
9
0.
08
9
0.
08
2
0
.0
8
2
0
.0
7
5
0
.1
2
6
0
.1
2
6
0
.1
0
8
0
.0
8
9
0
.0
8
9
0
.0
8
1
0
.0
9
8
0
.0
9
8
0
.0
8
5
U
rb
a
n
A
n
d
h
ra
P
ra
d
es
h
0.
15
6
0.
15
6
0.
15
6
0.
15
8
0
.1
5
8
0
.1
5
3
0
.2
2
4
0
.2
2
4
0
.2
0
0
0
.2
0
8
0
.2
0
8
0
.2
0
4
0
.1
6
9
0
.1
6
9
0
.1
5
6
A
ss
am
0.
13
5
0.
13
5
0.
13
5
0.
16
0
0
.1
6
0
0
.1
6
5
0
.1
6
0
0
.1
6
0
0
.1
4
8
0
.1
8
6
0
.1
8
6
0
.1
8
2
0
.2
1
8
0
.2
1
8
0
.2
1
0
B
ih
ar
0.
13
7
0.
13
7
0.
13
7
0.
15
8
0
.1
5
8
0
.1
5
4
0
.1
7
7
0
.1
7
7
0
.1
5
4
0
.1
8
4
0
.1
8
4
0
.1
6
3
0
.1
3
7
0
.1
3
7
0
.1
2
0
C
h
h
at
ti
sg
ar
h
0.
13
1
0.
13
1
0.
13
1
0.
14
8
0
.1
4
8
0
.1
4
8
0
.2
4
6
0
.2
4
6
0
.2
2
8
0
.1
4
6
0
.1
4
6
0
.1
4
0
0
.2
7
2
0
.2
7
2
0
.2
4
7
G
u
ja
ra
t
0.
12
8
0.
12
8
0.
12
8
0.
14
9
0
.1
4
9
0
.1
4
3
0
.1
7
1
0
.1
7
1
0
.1
5
0
0
.1
6
7
0
.1
6
7
0
.1
5
2
0
.1
5
1
0
.1
5
1
0
.1
2
1
H
ar
ya
n
a
0.
12
3
0.
12
3
0.
12
3
0.
14
5
0
.1
4
5
0
.1
4
1
0
.2
0
7
0
.2
0
7
0
.1
9
8
0
.2
3
0
0
.2
3
0
0
.2
3
4
0
.2
7
1
0
.2
7
1
0
.2
6
5
J
h
ar
k
h
an
d
0.
16
9
0.
16
9
0.
16
9
0.
21
3
0
.2
1
3
0
.2
1
4
0
.1
9
4
0
.1
9
4
0
.1
9
1
0
.2
0
2
0
.2
0
2
0
.1
9
5
0
.2
0
9
0
.2
0
9
0
.1
9
4
K
ar
n
at
ak
a
0.
15
7
0.
15
7
0.
15
7
0.
17
1
0
.1
7
1
0
.1
7
2
0
.2
3
4
0
.2
3
4
0
.2
1
8
0
.2
3
1
0
.2
3
1
0
.2
1
9
0
.2
8
8
0
.2
8
8
0
.2
7
3
K
er
al
a
0.
16
7
0.
16
7
0.
16
7
0.
17
1
0
.1
7
1
0
.1
7
3
0
.2
6
7
0
.2
6
7
0
.2
5
1
0
.2
4
4
0
.2
4
4
0
.2
3
4
0
.2
6
9
0
.2
6
9
0
.2
4
7
M
ad
h
ya
P
ra
d
es
h
0.
16
6
0.
16
6
0.
16
6
0.
16
6
0
.1
6
6
0
.1
6
4
0
.2
3
3
0
.2
3
3
0
.2
1
6
0
.2
4
6
0
.2
4
6
0
.2
5
1
0
.2
6
3
0
.2
6
3
0
.2
8
0
M
ah
ar
as
h
tr
a
0.
19
0
0.
19
0
0.
19
0
0.
20
6
0
.2
0
6
0
.2
1
1
0
.2
3
6
0
.2
3
6
0
.2
2
6
0
.2
5
4
0
.2
5
4
0
.2
5
3
0
.2
3
7
0
.2
3
7
0
.2
3
3
O
d
is
h
a
0.
14
2
0.
14
2
0.
14
2
0.
15
6
0
.1
5
6
0
.1
5
6
0
.1
9
8
0
.1
9
8
0
.1
8
7
0
.2
6
8
0
.2
6
8
0
.2
7
4
0
.2
1
0
0
.2
1
0
0
.2
1
1
P
u
n
ja
b
0.
11
5
0.
11
5
0.
11
5
0.
15
3
0
.1
5
3
0
.1
5
0
0
.1
9
6
0
.1
9
6
0
.1
8
0
0
.2
3
0
0
.2
3
0
0
.2
2
3
0
.1
6
9
0
.1
6
9
0
.1
5
7
R
a
ja
st
h
an
0.
13
1
0.
13
1
0.
13
1
0.
13
6
0
.1
3
6
0
.1
3
0
0
.1
8
6
0
.1
8
6
0
.1
6
5
0
.1
7
6
0
.1
7
6
0
.1
6
1
0
.1
7
9
0
.1
7
9
0
.1
5
4
T
am
il
N
ad
u
0.
17
6
0.
17
6
0.
17
6
0.
16
7
0
.1
6
7
0
.1
6
5
0
.2
1
7
0
.2
1
7
0
.2
0
2
0
.1
6
6
0
.1
6
6
0
.1
5
9
0
.1
7
3
0
.1
7
3
0
.1
6
4
U
tt
ar
P
ra
d
es
h
0.
16
6
0.
16
6
0.
16
6
0.
19
9
0
.1
9
9
0
.2
0
0
0
.2
3
4
0
.2
3
4
0
.2
2
9
0
.3
0
7
0
.3
0
7
0
.3
2
3
0
.3
1
3
0
.3
1
3
0
.3
1
8
W
es
t
B
en
ga
l
0.
18
9
0.
18
9
0.
18
9
0.
16
9
0
.1
6
9
0
.1
6
0
0
.2
3
2
0
.2
3
2
0
.2
0
2
0
.2
7
8
0
.2
7
8
0
.2
6
0
0
.2
6
0
0
.2
6
0
0
.2
4
7
N
o
te
:
“
C
o
n
s”
d
en
o
te
s
th
e
co
n
su
m
p
ti
o
n
in
d
ex
;
“
E
x
p
-h
’
d
en
o
te
s
th
e
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
h
o
m
o
th
et
ic
in
d
ex
,
a
n
d
“
E
x
p
-n
h
’
d
en
o
te
s
th
e
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
n
o
n
-h
o
m
o
th
et
ic
in
d
ex
.
30
Table 5: Percentage changes in relative prices and inequality
Dep.var: %-changes in relative inequality Combined Rural Urban
(1) (2) (3)
%-changes in relative prices 0.259 0.231 0.259
(0.045) (0.029) (0.030)
Constant 1.003 0.995 1.000
(0.008) (0.005) (0.005)
R2 0.396 0.545 0.593
N 51 51 51
Note: “Relative prices” shows the percentage changes in the price ratio of cereals over miscellaneous non-foods,
whereas “relative inequality” shows the percentage changes in the ratio of the non-homothetic Theil index over the
homothetic Theil index. All numbers are population weighted, using the multipliers provided by the NSS.
Table 6: Population shares and expenditure ratios
1993–94 1999–00 2004–05 2009–10 2011–12
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Rural households in crop production
Population share
of rural population 0.68 0.62 0.55 0.53 0.44
of total population 0.51 0.47 0.42 0.39 0.31
Per capita expenditure ratio
of rural non-crops 0.90 0.89 0.87 0.90 0.90
of all non-crops 0.77 0.72 0.69 0.69 0.71
Rural crop labours
Population share
of rural population 0.30 0.29 0.22 0.23 0.16
of total population 0.23 0.22 0.17 0.17 0.11
Per capita expenditure ratio
of rural non-crops 0.77 0.78 0.72 0.76 0.77
of all non-crops 0.69 0.64 0.59 0.59 0.60
Note: The expenditure ratios show the ratio of the average per capita expenditure of rural crop producers over the
average per capita expenditure of households outside crop production. All numbers are population weighted, using
the multipliers provided by the NSS.
Table 7: Expenditure ratios vs. relative prices
Engaged in crops Crops labours
Dep. var.: %-changes in expenditure ratios Rural All Rural All
(1) (2) (3) (4)
%-changes in relative prices 0.089 0.198 0.243 0.348
(0.056) (0.068) (0.064) (0.077)
Constant 0.004 -0.030 0.004 -0.038
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Observations 51 51 51 51
R2 0.050 0.149 0.229 0.293
Note: The table shows the results from regressing the percentage change in the expenditure ratio (ratio of the
average per capita expenditure of rural crop producers over the average per capita expenditure of households
outside crop production) on the percentage change in relative prices (cereals over miscellaneous non-food). Robust
standard errors are shown in parentheses.
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Table 8: Theil index vs. relative prices
Exp-h Exp-nh
Dep. var.: %-changes in Theil index Rural All Rural All
(1) (2) (3) (4)
%-changes in relative prices -0.378 -0.480 -0.126 -0.200
(0.168) (0.132) (0.171) (0.131)
Constant 0.030 0.110 0.029 0.106
(0.030) (0.022) (0.030) (0.022)
Observations 51 51 51 51
R2 0.094 0.214 0.011 0.045
Note: The table shows the results from regressing the percentage change in the Theil index on the percentage
change in relative prices (cereals over miscellaneous non-food). Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
“Exp-h” and “Exp-nh” denote estimates from the expenditure homothetic and expenditure non-homothetic
indices, respectively.
Table 9: Cereal budget share regression
Dep. var: Cereal budget share (1) (2)
Crops labours 0.0595 0.0152
(0.0004) (0.0003)
Crops self-employed 0.0286 0.0143
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Log per capita expenditure -0.3693
(0.0015)
Log per capita expenditure squared 0.0204
(0.0001)
Constant 0.0987 1.7195
(0.0010) (0.0053)
N 450.211 450.210
R2 0.447 0.677
Unit fixed effects yes yes
Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
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Table 10: Unit values: medians, “Deaton et al. (2004)-adjustment” and our iteration procedure
Rural Urban
(βˆ) 1993-94 1999-00 2004-05 2009-10 2011-12 1993-94 1999-00 2004-05 2009-10 2011-12
Rice
UV Median 6.9 11.1 10.9 18.4 20.7 7.7 12.4 12.1 21.5 23.7
pˆ1 (Deaton et al. (2004)) (0.191) 8.7 12.5 12.1 18.5 19.2 9.3 13.5 13.0 20.2 21.0
pˆ2 (0.194) 7.6 11.8 11.7 19.1 20.4 8.2 12.9 12.8 21.3 22.6
pˆ3 (0.194) 7.4 11.7 11.6 19.3 20.6 8.1 12.8 12.8 21.5 22.9
pˆ4 (0.194) 7.4 11.7 11.6 19.3 20.6 8.1 12.8 12.8 21.5 22.9
pˆ5 (0.194) 7.4 11.7 11.6 19.3 20.6 8.1 12.8 12.8 21.5 22.9
pˆ6 (0.194) 7.4 11.7 11.6 19.3 20.6 8.1 12.8 12.8 21.5 22.9
Wheat
UV Median 5.1 9.2 9.8 16.1 17.0 5.7 9.9 10.5 17.2 18.3
pˆ1 (Deaton et al. (2004)) (0.072) 5.4 9.2 9.8 15.9 16.2 5.8 9.9 10.5 16.8 17.5
pˆ2 (0.073) 5.1 8.9 9.7 16.1 16.6 5.5 9.7 10.5 17.1 18.0
pˆ3 (0.073) 5.1 8.9 9.7 16.2 16.6 5.5 9.7 10.5 17.1 18.1
pˆ4 (0.073) 5.1 8.9 9.7 16.2 16.6 5.5 9.7 10.5 17.2 18.1
pˆ5 (0.073) 5.1 8.9 9.7 16.2 16.6 5.5 9.7 10.5 17.2 18.1
pˆ6 (0.073) 5.1 8.9 9.7 16.2 16.6 5.5 9.7 10.5 17.2 18.1
Milk
UV Median 6.6 10.6 11.6 19.0 25.1 8.0 12.3 13.7 20.9 27.0
pˆ1 (Deaton et al. (2004)) (0.074) 7.1 11.0 12.4 18.5 23.7 8.3 12.3 13.9 20.0 25.5
pˆ2 (0.075) 6.8 10.7 12.2 18.7 24.2 7.9 12.1 13.8 20.5 26.3
pˆ3 (0.075) 6.7 10.7 12.2 18.8 24.3 7.9 12.1 13.8 20.5 26.4
pˆ4 (0.075) 6.7 10.7 12.2 18.8 24.3 7.9 12.1 13.8 20.5 26.4
pˆ5 (0.075) 6.7 10.7 12.2 18.8 24.3 7.9 12.1 13.8 20.5 26.4
pˆ6 (0.075) 6.7 10.7 12.2 18.8 24.3 7.9 12.1 13.8 20.5 26.4
Fish, prawn
UV Median 24.2 38.8 47.2 75.5 95.6 29.2 40.6 47.9 80.2 101.6
pˆ1 (Deaton et al. (2004)) (0.191) 29.4 42.5 49.5 72.3 89.2 33.4 43.5 50.6 75.7 90.5
pˆ2 (0.194) 25.7 40.0 48.0 74.8 94.7 29.7 41.5 49.8 79.7 97.6
pˆ3 (0.194) 25.3 39.7 47.9 75.3 95.5 29.3 41.3 49.8 80.4 98.8
pˆ4 (0.193) 25.3 39.7 47.9 75.3 95.6 29.2 41.3 49.8 80.5 98.9
pˆ5 (0.193) 25.3 39.7 47.9 75.3 95.6 29.2 41.3 49.8 80.5 98.9
pˆ6 (0.193) 25.3 39.7 47.9 75.3 95.6 29.2 41.3 49.8 80.5 99.0
Mustard oil
UV Median 32.4 41.4 56.4 65.4 84.0 33.2 43.1 60.6 68.7 82.9
pˆ1 (Deaton et al. (2004)) (0.004) 32.1 40.9 55.7 61.3 85.0 31.4 42.2 60.7 69.4 83.8
pˆ2 (0.004) 32.0 40.8 55.7 61.3 85.1 31.3 42.1 60.7 69.5 84.0
pˆ3 (0.004) 32.0 40.8 55.7 61.4 85.2 31.3 42.1 60.7 69.5 84.0
pˆ4 (0.004) 32.0 40.8 55.7 61.4 85.2 31.3 42.1 60.7 69.5 84.0
pˆ5 (0.004) 32.0 40.8 55.7 61.4 85.2 31.3 42.1 60.7 69.5 84.0
pˆ6 (0.004) 32.0 40.8 55.7 61.4 85.2 31.3 42.1 60.7 69.5 84.0
Sugar
UV Median 12.9 16.6 18.8 34.8 32.8 12.8 16.5 18.6 34.5 32.8
pˆ1 (Deaton et al. (2004)) (0.003) 13.2 16.5 18.6 34.7 32.8 13.1 16.4 18.7 34.5 32.7
pˆ2 (0.003) 13.1 16.5 18.6 34.8 32.9 13.1 16.4 18.6 34.5 32.8
pˆ3 (0.003) 13.1 16.5 18.6 34.8 32.9 13.1 16.4 18.6 34.5 32.8
pˆ4 (0.003) 13.1 16.5 18.6 34.8 32.9 13.1 16.4 18.6 34.5 32.8
pˆ5 (0.003) 13.1 16.5 18.6 34.8 32.9 13.1 16.4 18.6 34.5 32.8
pˆ6 (0.003) 13.1 16.5 18.6 34.8 32.9 13.1 16.4 18.6 34.5 32.8
Firewood and chips
UV Median 0.6 1.0 1.1 2.0 2.7 0.9 1.3 1.4 2.5 3.4
pˆ1 (Deaton et al. (2004)) (0.097) 0.7 1.1 1.3 2.0 2.6 0.9 1.4 1.7 2.4 3.2
pˆ2 (0.099) 0.7 1.0 1.3 2.0 2.7 0.9 1.3 1.7 2.5 3.3
pˆ3 (0.099) 0.7 1.0 1.3 2.0 2.7 0.9 1.3 1.7 2.5 3.3
pˆ4 (0.099) 0.7 1.0 1.3 2.0 2.7 0.9 1.3 1.7 2.5 3.4
pˆ5 (0.099) 0.7 1.0 1.3 2.0 2.7 0.9 1.3 1.7 2.5 3.4
pˆ6 (0.099) 0.7 1.0 1.3 2.0 2.7 0.9 1.3 1.7 2.5 3.4
Ready-made garments
UV Median 49.4 91.9 108.2 181.1 183.0 67.7 127.0 137.5 234.8 229.4
pˆ1 (Deaton et al. (2004)) (0.473) 87.0 124.0 136.3 179.9 152.7 98.6 140.9 146.1 195.1 167.0
pˆ2 (0.480) 62.3 106.6 125.7 196.1 176.5 73.2 125.3 140.5 222.1 201.8
pˆ3 (0.479) 60.1 105.2 125.0 199.0 180.5 70.9 124.0 140.5 226.6 207.7
pˆ4 (0.479) 59.8 105.0 124.9 199.3 181.0 70.6 123.9 140.4 227.2 208.4
pˆ5 (0.479) 59.8 105.0 124.9 199.3 181.0 70.6 123.9 140.4 227.3 208.5
pˆ6 (0.479) 59.8 105.0 124.9 199.3 181.1 70.5 123.9 140.4 227.3 208.5
Note: The table shows different item price estimates. “UV Median” shows the average over median unit values
within each unit, whereas pˆi shows the price estimates from the ith iteration of the procedure explained in Section
5.2. bˆ present the quality-expenditure elasticity from each of these iterations.
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Table 11: Number of households
1993–94 1999–00 2004–05 2009–10 2011–12
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total 97.965 100.954 99.788 80.386 80.409
1 adult & 0 children 6.166 6.052 5.620 4.683 4.613
2 adults & 0 children 8.432 7.887 8.567 7.988 8.078
2 adults & 1 child 6.329 6.412 6.300 5.339 5.614
2 adults & 2 children 9.015 9.971 10.182 8.726 8.695
2 adults & 3 children 6.851 7.212 6.684 4.492 4.189
3 adults & 0 children 5.259 5.162 5.626 5.451 5.814
3 adults & 1 child 4.075 4.458 4.447 3.915 4.173
3 adults & 2 children 4.458 4.537 4.688 3.857 3.647
4 adults & 0 children 4.656 4.762 5.373 5.270 5.439
4 adults & 1 child 3.708 3.966 3.952 3.769 3.934
4 adults & 2 children 3.407 3.321 3.694 3.181 3.149
Note: The table shows the number of households within each of the subsamples.
Table 12: PDS statistics
Share of HHs Avg pc q PDS UV market UV PDS PDS HHs w market
Rice Wheat Rice Wheat Rice Wheat Rice Wheat Rice Wheat
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Rural
1993-94 0.21 0.01 3 2 7 4 5 5 0.76 0.06
1999-00 0.29 0.16 3 1 11 9 5 4 0.86 0.44
2004-05 0.22 0.11 4 3 11 9 6 5 0.74 0.32
2009-10 0.37 0.28 4 2 18 15 5 6 0.80 0.49
2011-12 0.43 0.34 4 2 20 16 6 7 0.81 0.54
Urban
1993-94 0.25 0.01 3 2 8 5 5 5 0.80 0.09
1999-00 0.21 0.16 3 2 12 10 7 6 0.88 0.42
2004-05 0.14 0.07 4 2 12 11 6 5 0.80 0.39
2009-10 0.22 0.20 4 2 23 17 4 6 0.87 0.49
2011-12 0.25 0.22 3 2 24 19 6 7 0.85 0.52
Note: “Share of HHs” displays the share of all households with any consumption of PDS rice and wheat,
respectively. “Avg pc q PDS” presents the average per capita quantities (kg) for households with any PDS
consumption. “UV market” and “UV PDS” show the average state and sector-specific median unit value for
market purchases and PDS purchases, respectively. Finally, “PDS HHs w market” shows the fraction of
households with any PDS consumption that report purchases of the same item in the market.
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Table 13: Unit values and CPI price estimates
UVfood CPIfood CPIm.n-f
CPIfood
CPIm.n-f
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rural
1993–94 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1999–00 1.56 1.51 1.65 1.10
2004–05 1.72 1.60 1.95 1.22
2009–10 2.91 2.61 2.64 1.01
2011–12 3.28 2.90 3.09 1.06
Urban
1993–94 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1999–00 1.55 1.61 1.69 1.05
2004–05 1.69 1.80 2.22 1.24
2009–10 2.88 2.95 3.21 1.09
2011–12 3.30 3.36 3.78 1.13
Note: “UVfood” presents the unit value food index, “CPIfood” presents the CPI food index, “CPIm.n−f” presents
the CPI sub-index that corresponds to our rest group, whereas
CPIfood
CPIm.n-f
displays the ratio of the CPI food index
over the CPI rest group index.
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Figure 1: Relative increases in cost-of-living
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Note: The graphs show the relative increase in cost-of-living for some selected expenditure groups, relative to the
average of all expenditure groups.
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Figure 2: Trends in consumption inequality
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Note: The graphs show trends in real consumption inequality using the different cost-of-living indices. The left
panel presents inequality for the rural and the urban sector combined, whereas the middle and the right panel
display inequality separately for the two sectors.
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Note: The graphs show trends in between-group inequality using the different cost-of-living indices. “Sectors”
shows inequality in average real consumption between the rural and the urban sector; “States” shows inequality in
averages between states (rural and urban sector combined); whereas “Sector-states” presents inequality between
every state and sector (what we call “units”).
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Figure 3: Percentage changes in relative prices and inequality
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Note: “Relative prices” shows the percentage changes in the price ratio of cereals over miscellaneous non-foods,
whereas “relative inequality” shows the percentage changes in the ratio of the non-homothetic Theil index over the
homothetic Theil index. All numbers are population weighted, using the multipliers provided by the NSS.
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Figure 4: Theil index, reference prices
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Note: The left panel in the graphs shows trends in inequality using the different reference price vectors and the
expenditure non-homothetic cost-of-living index. The middle panel shows the differences between these estimates
and those derived through the consumption index, whereas the right panel presents the differences versus the
estimates derived through the expenditure homothetic index.
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Figure 5: Trends in consumption group prices
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Note: The graphs show price trends for the ten first consumption groups. “Median UVs” shows trends using
median unit values within each unit, “Deaton et al. (2004)” shows trends using the quality adjustment suggested
by Deaton and co-authors, whereas “6.Iteration” displays the price trends when using the price estimates from the
6th iteration in our proposed procedure (pˆ6).
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Figure 6: Theil index, quality-adjusted unit values
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Note: The left panel in the graphs shows trends in inequality using the expenditure non-homothetic cost-of-living
index, based on the median unit values and the quality-adjusted unit values. The middle panel shows the
differences between these estimates and those derived through the consumption index, whereas the right panel
presents the differences versus the inequality estimates derived through the expenditure homothetic index.
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Figure 7: Theil index, equivalence scaling
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Note: The left panel in the graphs shows trends in inequality using the expenditure non-homothetic cost-of-living
index, based on per capita expenditure and equivalence scaled expenditure. The middle panel shows the
differences between these estimates and those derived through the consumption index, whereas the right panel
presents the differences versus the inequality estimates derived through the expenditure homothetic index.
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Figure 8: Relative increases in cost-of-living, Rural
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Note: The graphs show the relative increase in cost-of-living for some selected expenditure groups, relative to the
average of all expenditure groups.
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Figure 9: Relative increases in cost-of-living, Urban
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Note: The graphs show the relative increase in cost-of-living for some selected expenditure groups, relative to the
average of all expenditure groups.
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Figure 10: Theil index, the PDS
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Note: The left panel in the graphs shows trends in inequality using the expenditure non-homothetic cost-of-living
index, based on the PDS valued at market prices and at actual prices paid. The middle panel shows the
differences between these estimates and those derived through the consumption index, whereas the right panel
presents the differences versus the inequality estimates derived through the expenditure homothetic index.
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